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High-risk pools are created by states to expand the availability of 
private health insurance for individuals who have serious medical con 
ditions and have difficulty purchasing insurance. Such pools are relatively 
attractive politically as a mechanism for reducing the size of the unin 
sured population in a state and do, in fact, permit some medically (not 
economically) needy individuals to purchase health insurance.
There is a sizable and growing population of individuals with medical 
conditions or past medical experiences that indicate the potential for 
high medical bills in the future. Private insurance companies consider 
these people "bad risks" and may substantially increase their premium, 
exclude treatment for the pre-existing condition, or refuse to sell them 
insurance (Griss 1988, p. 43). Such actions make it impractical or im 
possible for some people to buy coverage, particularly if they are not 
part of a group plan. Estimates of the size of this population vary, but 
they are often in the vicinity of 1 percent of the total population or 1 
percent of the under 65 population (Bovbjerg and Koller 1986, p. Ill; 
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988, p. 13). The Health In 
surance Survey of Michigan found that 1.5 percent of the state's total 
population had no insurance, ranked their health status as fair or poor, 
and/or felt they had a disabling condition (Bashshur, Webb, and Homan 
1989). There is agreement that, regardless of the precise size of this 
population today, it is growing and will continue to for the foreseeable 
future.
The numbers of the difficult-to-insure are growing for several reasons. 
First, early detection and medical treatments are increasing the survival 
rates for many diseases. Second, screening programs are detecting
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diseases at earlier stages, before symptoms become evident (U.S. Con 
gress 1988a,b). Third, competitive pressures on insurers to hold down 
premiums lead them to reduce risks by taking action when possible 
against those with specific, known medical conditions. And, fourth, 
employers are under pressure to minimize their costs and are tempted 
to take corresponding actions against the same individuals. Future trends 
in medical technology and health care cost inflation point toward an 
expanding population of the medically uninsurable. High-risk pools ap 
pear to be an obvious answer to this problem.
What Is a High-Risk Pool and How Does It Work?
Organization
The general structure of high-risk pools is similar from state to state, 
although there is some variation in the details. The pool is created by 
state legislation, which forms an association of all health insurance com 
panies doing business in the state and establishes an independent govern 
ing board. Some states also require health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) to participate. Self-insured plans are not included because of 
their exemption from state regulation under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The pool is governed by a board 
including representatives of the insurance industry, state government 
officials, and consumers. It is responsible for setting the package of 
benefits, recommending premium rates, and contracting with a private 
insurance company to administer the program on a daily basis as the 
lead carrier. Insurance agents receive a fee fixed by the pool for enrolling 
new members. It is less than a commission would be and provides some 
savings on administrative costs. The state insurance department pro 
vides oversight for the program.
Benefit Package
The enabling legislation generally requires the pool to offer insurance 
coverage of a full and traditional range of major medical services similar 
to that offered in large group plans. The benefits are not designed
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specifically to include all the providers and treatments often needed by 
individuals with chronic and/or handicapping conditions, just those stan 
dard for acute medical care. Where there are service limits, they tend 
to be relatively high and provider reimbursement is reasonable. There 
is a maximum limit on total dollar lifetime benefits and also annual limits 
on out-of-pocket spending (stop/loss). Copayments are usually at 20 
percent, and there are deductibles with amounts that vary from state 
to state. Some pools offer different deductible levels, depending on which 
option/premium level the enrollee chooses (see Table 1). Some states 
include in their benefit package some cost-containment mechanisms, 
such as utilization controls.
Premium
The state enabling legislation imposes a limit on the premiums that 
can be charged. The maximum is a percentage (generally 150 percent) 
of the average premium rates for standard health risks with comparable 
coverage (see Table 2). The premiums are rated for age and sex. While 
the pools start with premiums below the maximum, they rapidly in 
crease to the limit as the costs become evident.
Financing
Most pools operate at a loss because the utilization and health care 
costs of high-risk individuals are significantly greater than 150 percent 
of the average, but their premiums are capped. The losses most often 
are paid by the member insurance companies, based on their market 
share in the state. In a few states, the companies must treat this assess 
ment as part of the costs of doing business in the state. Elsewhere, the 
companies are permitted a credit against their state tax bills for the full 
assessment (see Table 2).
Eligibility
The pools are designed primarily for the medically "uninsurable" 
and require evidence from the applicant of that status. They reject the 
insurance concept of spreading the risk broadly across a heterogeneous 
population and anticipate the inevitable adverse selection. Even states
Table 1 
State High-Risk Pools: Eligibility and Benefit Structure





All residents ineligible for Medicare 















Rejected by 2 insurers,
Received notice of benefit reduction, or
Premium increase exceeded pool rate 
Illinois Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 250-1,500
Rejected by 1 insurer,
Premium increase exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Also, groups of 10 or less if 1 or more meets
above criteria 
Indiana Residents ineligible for Medicare, plus 200-1,000
Rejected by 2 insurers,
Received notice of benefit reduction,
Premium increase exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Iowa Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 500-1,000
Rejected by 1 insurer,
Premium exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Maine Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 500-1,000 
plus




















Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, 
Premium exceeded pool rate, or 
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Rejected by 2 insurers, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 
plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, or 
Premium exceeded pool rate
Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 
plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, or 
Premium exceeded pool rate
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Received notice of benefit reduction, or






















SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc 1988; Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988, p. 5; and U S General Accounting Office 1988, 
pp. 11-14.
Table 2 




























































-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit removed
1989
-limit on assessments: < 1 % of health
insurance premiums written in state
-legislative appropriation of general
revenues
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-new tax of up to .0015% on hospital
gross patient services revenue














































-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; no tax credit until
member's assessment > $75 ,000,
then 30% credit allowed for excess
amount over $75,000
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-state cap of $3 million/yr. on state
funds to pay pool costs
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; no tax credit
-$200,000 tax relief from general
revenues as of 1/1/88 Iera"
N4P*
SOURCES: Burda 1989, p. 54, Communicating for Agriculture, Inc. 1988, Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988; Marvin 1990; and Tnppler 1990. 
These percentages represent the limit on pool premiums relative to the average premium charged in the state for comparable policies for standard health nsks.
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that permit normal-risk applicants to enroll expect primarily high-risk 
individuals. Adverse selection tends to have a snowball effect and even 
tually drives out normal-risk individuals who can find lower premiums 
elsewhere.
What Has Been the Impact of High-Risk Pools?
Historical Growth
The first high-risk pools were created in Connecticut and Minnesota 
in 1976, and since then 17 more states have passed enabling legisla 
tion. Of those 19, 5 are not yet operational California, Georgia, 
Oregon, South Carolina and Texas. Many states are currently considering 
such legislation (Marvin 1990). The concept is popular politically because 
the high-risk pool appears to serve a needy and deserving population, 
is operated through the private sector, and provides an indirect and seem 
ingly limited role for the state government. However, while there may 
be no public discussion of a sizable appropriation to fund the pool's 
deficit, legislators are becoming more aware of the financing limita 
tions of the traditional pool concept and the implications of the tax credit.
Costs and Losses
As pool enrollments grow, so do their losses. This may not be a serious 
problem during the first years of a program, in part because of pre 
existing conditions clauses and the normal time lag of medical bills. 
Also, the total deficit starts out relatively small because there are few 
enrollees. However, the average enrollee generates greater costs than 
the premium he or she pays even in Connecticut, where more normal 
risks are included in the pool. The 14 pools operating in 1988 showed 
a total of more than $65 million in claims paid compared to $39 million 
in premiums collected (Burda 1989, p. 54). (See Table 2.) Administrative 
costs of 12 to 15 percent of total pool spending increase the deficits 
even more (Bovbjerg and Roller 1986, p. 118).
The claims costs per enrollee vary widely, depending in part upon 
the maturity of the program and the medical cost index in each geographic
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area. Minnesota found that 1 percent of its enrollment generated 30 per 
cent of its claims costs. Such data are unavailable for other states. Since 
Minnesota has less adverse selection than some states because of its 
relatively low premiums, it may have a relatively large group that 
generates few claims. Nonetheless, it is likely in all pools that a small 
portion of enrollees generate a disproportionately large share of the costs 
(Trippler 1990).
Cost Burden
It is not entirely obvious who bears the costs of the high-risk pools. 
The premium, which is itself only part of total costs, is normally paid 
by the enrollee (except in Wisconsin and Maine, where the state pro 
vides a direct subsidy of premiums for low-income enrollees). However, 
some enrollees have their premium paid by their employers. In some 
states, there are indications that 15 to 20 percent of the pool's enrollees 
may have such an arrangement. This means that employers and perhaps 
their group insurers are taking advantage of the existence of a high- 
risk pool to off-load their high-risk employees and to keep their group 
plan costs at a more reasonable level. The employer and other employees 
benefit because the premiums will be lower without high-cost employee 
members. Also, high-risk workers seeking employment do not have 
to fear discrimination in hiring based on employers' fears about high 
group medical costs.
On the other hand, the state is usually picking up the deficits from 
those high-risk employees who previously had been covered privately. 
Certainly, many pool boards are very concerned about this phenomenon 
(Marvin 1990).
Since the premium covers substantially less than the full program costs, 
who pays the deficit? In the states that permit the insurance companies 
to offset their assessment as a tax credit, the result is a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction of general revenues. It represents a tax expenditure and its 
effect is the same as a direct appropriation. Hence, the taxpayers in 
the state bear that burden. Tennessee's recently passed legislation places 
a limit of $3 million on annual pool costs to the state. In states such
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as Minnesota, which eliminated the tax credit for pool deficits, the in 
surers bear the deficits as a cost of doing business. Thus, the insurance 
companies' owners and/or customers (employers, employees and private, 
nongroup enrollees) pay the extra costs. Members of self-insured plans 
are unaffected. Those plans are growing in popularity, to some extent 
because of their competitive advantage. Illinois and Wisconsin recent 
ly passed legislation to fund all or part of the deficit through an ap 
propriation of general revenues, and thus the burden is spread broadly 
across all taxpayers. Maine funds its deficit by a new tax on hospital 
gross patient services revenue, so the cost is shifted to hospital users 
who pay their own bills and to third parties and their enrollees.
Enrollment Growth
Although there have been fluctuations in enrollment within pools, in 
total, there has been steady, moderate growth over the years. The latest 
enrollment figures show almost 42,000 individuals covered nationally 
(Burda 1989, p. 54). (See Table 2.) That is a small fraction of the medi 
cally uninsurable population, an estimated two to three million in the 
U.S. It is also much less than those who could afford to join (Fraser 1988, 
p. 202). Clearly, annual premiums of several thousand dollars are a 
barrier to all but those with middle- to upper-level incomes. And only 
30 to 40 percent of the uninsured have incomes above $20,000. Never 
theless, the participation of those with sufficient income is also low, 
perhaps because the marketing of the pools has not been very effective.
While the total enrollment of 42,000 seems low, it underestimates 
the total number of individuals served, since it is reflective of only one 
point in time. More individuals are served during the year as many move 
in and out of the program. For example, a high-risk individual would 
drop out if he or she became eligible for group coverage from a new 
job. The exact turnover rate in various pools is unknown, since most 
pools collect very little administrative data.
Cost-Containment
By definition, the high-risk pools suffer from adverse selection and 
have a relatively large share of heavy users of health services. Given
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their high volume and cost of services, cost-containment mechanisms 
are crucial to high-risk pools. Unfortunately, only half the pools have 
used cost controls as a standard part of their administrative practices 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). They have adopted a few 
selected cost-containment measures, such as preadmission certification 
for hospital care and second surgical opinion programs. However, much 
remains to be done in all the pools to initiate efforts to ensure effec 
tively and efficiently run programs.
What Are Policy Issues to Consider 
Before Initiating a Pool?
Is There an Insurer of Last Resort in the State?
Eleven states and the District of Columbia require Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield plans to offer open enrollment for individual (nongroup) coverage. 
The plans are not permitted to discriminate according to health status. If 
the premiums charged for this coverage are state-regulated as closely as 
would be a pool's premiums, there would be little need for a separate 
high-risk pool. If the state does not have an open enrollment regula 
tion, it might be worth examining the operation of this regulation in 
other states to determine whether it might be feasible and preferable 
to a high-risk pool. It is important to consider how and by whom the 
excessive costs of high-risk members would be covered in such an ar 
rangement. Note that the existence of an open enrollment requirement 
does not provide a total solution to the medically uninsurable problem. 
It has the same limitation as does the pool expensive premiums.
How Does the State Regulate 
Insurance Underwriting Currently?
The medically uninsurable population is defined, to some extent, by 
the insurance industry, which is regulated by the state. The existence 
and nature of restrictions placed on underwriting practices, methods 
for defining group plans, and so forth, can affect both the population 
left without coverage and the reaction of employers to the creation of
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a high-risk pool. For example, can employers and/or insurers define 
the members of a group plan based on the health status of individuals? 
Are insurers limited in the medical screening they can do? Can pre 
existing conditions be excluded from coverage when an employer 
switches plans?
Who Would Pay the Pool Losses 
and How Visible Should the Mechanism Be?
Ultimately this will be a political issue, but it is also useful to analyze 
it explicitly during the development of the proposal. It must be recognized 
from the start that losses are inevitable and will grow as the pool more 
successfully serves its target population.
How Can the State Promote Equitable Treatment 
of Both Private Insurance Plans and Self-Insured Groups?
The choice of financing mechanisms will affect the balance. Until 
federal legislation is passed to change the ERISA exemption, indirect 
methods and taxes may be necessary if the state wants to tap a broader 
funding source than just the private insurance plans.
What Should Be the State's Position Concerning 
the Shift of High-Risk Individuals from 
Employer Plans to the High-Risk Pool?
If the state is aware of the advantages and disadvantages of such shift 
ing from the private sector to the public, it could design pool details, 
such as regulatory controls, monitoring mechanisms, or employer taxes 
to create an equitable impact. Basically, is it preferable for the costs 
of employed high-risk individuals to be covered privately through 
employer groups or publicly through the pool's premium and deficit? 
What are the state's broader goals concerning private employer coverage?
What Cost-Containment Mechanisms 
Could Help Limit the Pool's Losses?
The state could look to efficiently run private and Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield insurance plans in its area, as well as to the current evaluation
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literature to see what mechanisms work and might be suitable to its 
population, medical providers, and so forth. Some administrative pro 
cedures and controls might be built into the benefit package and ad 
ministrative program during development, while others require a critical 
mass of enrollees in order to be practical.
Are the Pool Costs (Losses) Worth the Benefits 
in Terms of State Health Priorities and Population Needs?
Is a high-risk pool just a politically attractive, "doable" program com 
pared to other proposals for the uninsured, or is it really serving high- 
priority needs? Are the higher-priority programs not feasible at the mo 
ment and does the pool appear worthwhile even if of limited impact 
on the numbers of uninsured? Could the pool's deficit dollars be better 
spent on Medicaid expansion or a public health service program for 
poor children? Would those dollars be available for these possibly higher- 
priority populations?
Could the High-Risk Pool Be Adapted 
to Serve Other Priority Needs?
What kind of premium subsidies would be necessary to serve the 
medically uninsurable of low-to-moderate income who are not covered 
by Medicaid? Where would the money come from? Could the premiums 
be reduced by opening the pool to the uninsured of normal risk, and 
what changes would be necessary to attract them?
Conclusions
High-risk pools have been in operation since the late 1970s. None 
have failed. All have grown and are successfully making private health 
insurance available to those who can pay the premium. However, their 
costs to the public are not insignificant, though they are frequently not 
obvious. Also, while the program serves a politically attractive popula 
tion, it may not be meeting a high-priority policy need. The political 
and administrative costs as well as financial costs and time necessary
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to create and operate a high-risk pool should be weighed against the 
expected benefits from such a program. If it is a useful program for 
the state, care should be taken in the policy development process to 
incorporate effective cost controls, premium subsidies if necessary to 
serve priority populations, and an equitable financing mechanism.
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